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Summary
The concept of discrimination by association is the form of 
discrimination that occurs when the discriminatory ground applies 
to a person, but another person is detrimentally treated in 
consequence. Until recently it has had a low profile, appearing in 
just a handful of race relations cases concerning instructions to 
discriminate. However, the European Court of Justice, after a 
reference made to it by an employment tribunal, will rule on 
whether it has a wider application. If it does so, the effect in 
English law will be wide-ranging and of great importance. In 
addition, the government's Green Paper on the Single Equality Bill 
also addresses the issue. The present state of the law and the 
arguments for and against extending discrimination by association 
are discussed.
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Introduction
Unlawful direct discrimination typically occurs when A treats B less 
favourably than A does C, or would do, on a prohibited ground. 
Indirect discrimination occurs when the treatment is for another 
ground but which has thereby a disproportionate impact on a 
particular category of persons, that category being protected by 
law. That, at least, is how indirect discrimination is viewed as 
occurring under statute. However, discrimination of this type is not 
described as ‘indirect’ in any legislation. Neither is there any 
reason to restrict indirect discrimination to that description. 
Perhaps indirect discrimination is better viewed as any form of 
discrimination that is not direct.
Some discrimination may appear to be direct but be effected 
through indirect means, however. An example of this occurs when A 
discriminates against B (treats B less favourably than he treats, or 
would treat, C) but where the prohibited ground pertains to D. It 
includes the concept that has occasionally been termed 
'discrimination by association'. So, if A discriminates against B 
because B is associated with (e.g. married to) D, then 
discrimination by association against B may be said to occur 
because of D’s (not B’s) characteristics. The reason for the 
discrimination against B is that D has certain particular 
characteristics.
The term ‘transferred discrimination’ is perhaps preferable to 
‘discrimination by association’ in this context. Not all 
discrimination, as described above, is associative in any normal 
recognised sense. The bartender whose employer gives instructions 
that he is to refuse to serve ethnic minority or female would-be 
customers has no association as such with those people. Rather, the 
discrimination that is intended to be directed towards them (the 
would-be customers) has an additional discriminatory effect on 
another person – the bartender. In this sense, the discrimination is 
‘transferred’ from one party to another, although the discrimination 
to the other party may well remain. However, the term 
‘discrimination by association’, to be used here, has had a certain 
currency. For example, the Equality Commission for Northern 
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Ireland has been using the term since (at least) 2003. (See e.g. 
ECNI 2003 at p 24.) It was also the term favoured by the Disability 
Rights Commission (See e.g. DRC 2003 at p 83.) The government's 
recent Green Paper on the proposed Sex Equality Bill uses the term 
'discrimination on the basis of association', (See Green Paper 2007 
at pp 17 and 36.) 
Coleman v. Attridge Law
Whichever term turns out to be the regular currency, it is certain 
that it will become much more familiar than to date. The 
importance and range of the concept will shortly come into sharp 
focus. In the existing case-law on discrimination by association, the 
emphasis until now has been overwhelmingly in the context of race. 
Before long, however, these issues will have to addressed by 
government in that the European Court of Justice is due to examine 
discrimination by association with regard to disability 
discrimination in a case likely to be heard in 2008. Very unusually, 
Coleman v. Attridge Law Case C-303/06 is a reference by an 
employment tribunal directly to the ECJ and, if only for that reason, 
is remarkable. However, it is also of wider import in that it is the 
first time that discrimination by association has been judicially 
considered in a context other than race.  Mrs Coleman, who is not 
disabled herself, is claiming that her dismissal was on the grounds 
that she was the carer for her disabled son, and she therefore 
brought her claim under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 
(DDA 1995). If she succeeds it will be a highly significant decision 
due to the expansion of the contexts of discrimination by 
association but also because of the financial importance and 
numerical incidence of further possible claims.
Furthermore, however, it is very unlikely, important though this 
case will be to the issue of discrimination by association under the 
DDA 1995, that its impact will be confined to there. Mrs Coleman's 
argument is that Article 2.1 of the Equal Treatment Framework 
Directive (Council Directive No.2000/78/EC) states that the 
principle of equal treatment means that there shall be no direct or 
indirect discrimination whatsoever 'on any of the grounds' referred 
to in Article 1. These are, namely, religion or belief, disability, age 
and sexual orientation regarding 'employment and occupation'. 
There is no restriction of these grounds to those relating to the 
claimant only but, in addition, the wording reflects that in other 
Council Directives, namely the Equal Pay Directive (Council 
Directive No.75/117, Art.1), the Equal Treatment Directive (Council 
Directive No.76/207, Art.2)1 and the Race Directive (Council 
11.  This is unaffected by the amendments introduced by Parliament and 
Council Directive No 2002/73 (ETAD) in Art. 1.2. Suggestions therefore 
that the new Directive could lead to an acceptance of discrimination by 
association in sex discrimination cases seem ill-founded - see e.g. Rose, 
http://www.blackstonechambers.com/pdfFiles/Blackstone_DR_HOTTOPIC
Directive No.2000/43, Art.2). It is therefore difficult to see how the 
ECJ's ruling, whichever way it may go, will not have highly 
significant repercussions for other areas of discrimination law. 
The Respondents in Coleman appealed to the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal (EAT) on the basis that the ET should not have referred 
the issue to the ECJ, and comments made by the EAT there are of 
great interest. (See [2007] IRLR 88. In this case the EAT preferred 
the term 'associative discrimination'.) In deciding in Mrs Coleman's 
favour, the EAT recognised that the Directive is not directly 
enforceable between the parties. It also recognised that, on the 
face of it, the DDA does not cover discrimination by association 
(see para.6). The EAT concluded, nevertheless, that the DDA was 
capable of including discrimination by association without 
distortion of its wording so as to be consistent with the Directive 
which did prohibit such discrimination. Unfortunately, Judge Peter 
Clark (sitting alone) did not explain how it could do so, and seemed 
to assume that this would require additional wording to be added 
to the DDA to provide the necessary protection, but would leave 
that to the ECJ to decide (see para.19). He relied merely on the 
argument that the amending regulations to the DDA (SI 2003 No. 
1673) were introduced to implement fully the disability strand of 
the Framework Directive (see para. 21). This he felt was preferable 
to a reliance on the UK government's earlier opinion that the 
Directive did not cover discrimination by association, and neither 
did the DDA (see para. 20). The position at the moment, then, 
regarding these several issues, is very unclear.
Discrimination by Association in Legislation
It is easy to see how discrimination by association might apply in all 
the areas of discrimination prohibited by law. Not all of these types 
of discrimination are peripheral or incidental to the purposes of the 
legislation, but some lie at its core. So, if A discriminates against B 
because B's spouse is black; because B's children are girls; because 
B is a carer for a disabled dependant relative; because B's friend is 
a Muslim; because B provides services to homosexuals or because 
B's spouse is of a particular age, then discrimination by association 
S.pdf at  para7(b).  This  seems  to  be  borne  out  by  the  government's 
response document on its proposals for the Employment Equality (Sex 
Discrimination)  Regulations  (Northern  Ireland)  2005  (Statutory  Rule 
2005 No 426). It states there, in addressing calls for discrimination by 
association to be covered in sex discrimination cases, that it believed the 
ETAD was intended to be restricted to individuals'  own sex or gender 
reassignment. It points out that Article 2 ETAD refers both to "the sex of 
a person" and "on the grounds of  sex" and that  therefore there is no 
material  difference  between  the  two.  (At  para.2.20  –  see 
http://www.ofmdfmni.govuk/employment_equality_sex_discrimination_reg
ulations-4.pdf.) But, of course, that begs the question as "sex of a person" 
does not necessarily refer only to the sex of the complainant.
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has occurred. There are also areas of discrimination specifically 
covered by statutory provisions which may, nevertheless, be seen 
as a form of sex discrimination, namely gender reassignment (s 2A 
Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (hereafter SDA 1975) and 
pregnancy/maternity leave (s 3A SDA 1975). Discrimination on the 
ground of married or civil partnership status is also covered by the 
SDA 1975 (s 3).
The way the law approaches discrimination by association varies 
from provision to provision. It is not specifically identified in any 
legislation (namely the SDA1975, the Race Relations Act 1976, the 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995, the Employment Equality 
(Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, the Employment Equality 
(Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007 and the Employment 
Equality (Age) Regulations 2006) as a head of claim. Indeed, the 
term 'discrimination by association' has no statutory or, it seems, 
even judicial uniform basis. Whether it is covered in any given 
instance is a matter of construction merely. Most of the judicial 
discussion of the issue to date has been in the context of the Race 
Relations Act 1976 (hereafter RRA 1976) which has been taken to 
cover the idea in that s 1(1) refers to discrimination occurring 'on 
racial grounds' without specifying that it is confined to the race of 
the applicant. (This, at least, is the position with regards to direct 
race discrimination. The position is not so clear when it comes to 
indirect discrimination – see below.) However, as we shall see, the 
issue is now becoming of live interest in other legislative contexts.
The equivalent provision in the SDA 1975 is in almost identical 
terms, the differences arising almost exclusively from the different 
subject matter of race and sex. However, it requires the 
discrimination, if direct, to be on the grounds of the applicant's sex 
('on the ground of her sex'). It would thus appear that the SDA 
1975 is narrower than the RRA 1976, the latter allowing for claims 
to be brought by an applicant whose own race is irrelevant to the 
claim but who relies on the race of another as the foundation of the 
action. 
This is a curious distinction in that there have been various 
amendments to these provisions since they were first introduced 
and yet the opportunity has not been taken to iron out the 
inconsistency, if such it is. The distinction has, after all, been one 
that has been noticed for some time in the jurisprudence of the 
courts, even if the reasons for it have not been explored. That this 
has not happened suggests that it is thought that there is a rational 
basis for it. It is not at all clear what any justification could amount 
to for treating sex and race differently in this regard. However, the 
government in its recent Green Paper on harmonisation of 
discrimination law has indicated that it does not see the need for 
harmonisation in this particular regard. It merely states that, 
although discrimination by association on the grounds of race 
(along with other grounds) is rightly covered in existing legislation, 
the law of sex discrimination is aimed at protecting people in 
relation to their actual sex, not their perceived sex or because they 
associate with someone of a particular sex. They see no 'practical 
benefit' in extending the law. (See the Green Paper at pp 35 and 
36.) This suggests that the government does not envisage 
situations where discrimination by association with regard to sex is 
of significance, rather than because it sees any powerful arguments 
in principle for treating it differently to race discrimination. Indeed, 
apart from the possibly of gender reassignment (which clearly has 
no racial equivalent) and possibly a different degree of social 
impact (which would be highly questionable) there seems to be no 
difference between the two that could justify different treatment 
based on principle. The barman who is dismissed for refusing to 
obey instructions not to serve women should surely have the same 
protection as if he had been instructed not to serve blacks. Or the 
man who is discriminated against because he is refused a job 
because he is called Lesley, the employer having the mistaken 
belief that he is a woman, should surely have the same protection 
as if a woman called Lesley had been refused for the same reason. 
This would seem to be axiomatic.
There have, however, been divergent approaches in consequent 
discrimination legislation and there may be good reasons for this. 
The DDA 1995 requires the discrimination to be 'for a reason which 
relates to the disabled person's disability' (see s 3A DDA 1995 as 
inserted by the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (Amendment) 
Regulations 2003 S.I. 2003 No 1673) and it has been thought that 
this thereby excludes the possibility of discrimination by 
association, although on the wording that would not seem to be an 
inevitable conclusion. It does not appear that, in expanding the 
DDA 1995 in the DDA 2005, the Government considered including 
the possibility of discrimination by association in considering the 
definition of discrimination. (See the Memorandum from the 
Department for Work and Pensions (DDB 96) to the Joint 
Committee on the Draft Disability Discrimination Bill at para.4 - 
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.com/pa/jt200304/jtselect/jtdisab/82/4033108.htm.) However, 
the issue was raised by the Disability Law Association with the 
Disability Rights Commission when it was consulting on the 
definition of disability prior to the 2005 Act and it remains 
unconvinced that to do so would be 'proportionate'. (See the Green 
Paper at p 35.) It awaits the decision of the ECJ in Coleman before 
making a decision.
However, under Reg. 3 of the Employment Equality (Religion or 
Belief) Regulations (2003 SI 2003 No. 1660) as in their original 
form, a person (A) discriminated against B if A treated B less 
favourably 'on the grounds of religion or belief'. This suggests that 
discrimination by association was covered by the provision. 
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However, section 77(2) of the Equality Act 2006 now changes this 
to treatment of A by B 'on the grounds of the religion or belief of B 
or any other person except A (whether or not it is also A's religion 
or belief)'. It is interesting that this seems to make quite explicit 
that discrimination by association is still caught by the definition, 
but explicitly excludes the discriminator only. It is not clear why it 
was thought necessary to change this aspect of the definition, 
except for the obvious fact that it was to bring it into line with the 
definition in section 44 which extends protection against 
discrimination on grounds of religion or belief to the provision of 
goods, facilities, services, education, premises and the exercise of 
public functions.
Reg. 3(1)(a) of the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) 
Regulations 2003 (SI 2003 No. 1661), generally considered to be 
the sibling of the Religion or Belief Regulations, likewise stated 
only that discrimination occurred when it is 'on grounds of sexual 
orientation'. Although this seemed to include the possibility of 
discrimination by association, it did not do so explicitly in the way 
that the Religion or Belief Regulations did.  It was certainly the 
government's explicit intention that discrimination by association 
should be covered in new Regulations covering the provision of 
goods and services - see the DTI's Getting Equal: Proposals to 
Outlaw Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the Provision of Goods 
and Services at 
http://www.stonewall.org.uk/documents/getting_equal_march_2006.
pdf. It was also the government's understanding that the 2003 
sexual orientation regulations already covered discrimination by 
association - see Green Paper at p 36. The Equality Act (Sexual 
Orientation) Regulations 2007 (SI 2007 No. 1263) therefore now 
explicitly do so in similar wording (see Reg. 3(1)).
Transsexuals (including those undergoing or intending to undergo 
gender reassignment) have protection from discrimination by 
employers (see s 2A SDA 1975) but it is not possible to claim on the 
basis of another person's gender reassignment. The government 
intends, however, to extend coverage to discrimination by 
association in this regard. (See the Green Paper at p 36.) A possible 
source of difficulty here is that the government does not intend to 
give protection to people who are perceived to be transsexuals. 
Presumably, therefore, it does not intend that discrimination by 
association should cover those who are associated with those 
intending to undergo gender reassignment if they are in the early, 
pre-operative, stages of that process.
The Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006 (SI 2006 No. 
1031) seem to exclude entirely the possibility of discrimination by 
association on grounds of age by requiring that discrimination by A 
must be 'on grounds of B's age'. (Reg. 3(1)(a)). The government 
does not intend to alter this, the reason being, in effect, that too 
many categories of persons are affected by discrimination by 
association on this ground, namely 'parents, carers, teachers, 
dependants and many others, taking the legislation far beyond its 
intended scope' (see the Green Paper, at p 36). This is a most 
curious argument, and the mirror version of that for not extending 
coverage to cases of sex discrimination considered above. It seems 
that the government is not persuaded by views that there is a great 
need for such an extension in the law and neither by the argument 
that its effect would be minimal.
Existing Case-law on Discrimination by Association
The first case which became authority in this area was Showboat 
Entertainment Centre Ltd. v. Owen [1984] ICR 6. The employee 
was a white manager of an amusement arcade who was dismissed 
because he refused to carry out an instruction from his employers 
to exclude 'young blacks' from the premises. The EAT held that the 
wording of s 1 RRA 1976 allowed not only discrimination on the 
grounds of an applicant's race, but his attitude to race, to be taken 
into account. Thus the correct comparison to be made was not 
between the applicant and another manager who had refused to 
carry out the discriminatory instructions, but between the applicant 
and another manager who did not refuse obey those instructions 
(at p 73E.)
The issue had already been considered, but briefly, by the House of 
Lords in Race Relations Board v. Applin [1975] AC 259. The appeal 
tribunal in Showboat was not bound by dicta in the earlier case to 
the effect that discrimination by association was covered by the 
definition as only Lord Simon of Glaisdale dealt with the point on 
the rather different wording in the Race Relations Act 1968 (see p 
73C). He based his reasoning on two different grounds. The first 
was one of construction, namely that to deny the inclusion of 
discrimination by association would necessitate implying a 
reference in the Act to the applicant's colour, whereas it referred 
merely to 'racial grounds'. His second reason was based on policy. 
For example, if a white woman were discriminated against because 
she had married a coloured (sic) man, if discrimination by 
association were not covered by the definition this would mean 
conduct plainly within the mischief of the Act would escape. (See 
pp 289-290.) This reasoning led to the statement in Showboat, 
which causes so much difficulty in other contexts, that: 
"Once this point is reached, there seems to be no stopping 
short of holding that any discriminatory treatment caused by 
racial considerations is capable of falling within section 1 of 
the Act of 1976." (See p 73.)
The only other reported case to have considered the possibility of 
discrimination by association before Showboat was decided seems 
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to be Zarczynska v. Levy [1979] ICR 184. (A further case in an 
industrial tribunal was in 1977 in Wilson v. T B Steelwork Co. Ltd 
(Case No.23662/77). There a white woman was turned down for a 
job as her husband was not white. This was held to be on 'racial 
grounds'.) Zarczynska was another instance involving an 
instruction by an employer, who was the licensee of a public house, 
to the bar staff not to serve 'coloured people' as customers. The 
EAT in this case relied on statements made by Lord Denning MR 
and Stephenson LJ in the Applin case in the Court of Appeal 
(although, as we have seen, that case went on to the House of 
Lords) to the effect that discrimination by association was covered 
by the RRA 1976. It was important to take into account the purpose 
of the Act in order to avoid an absurdity. The EAT said, at p 184:
"We are of opinion here that if Parliament had had pre-
knowledge of this unfortunate complainant's predicament 
they would have made clear that the great civilised principle 
on which the Act was based was one which overrode all 
apparent limitations expressed in other sections which had 
the effect of denying justice to someone who was victimised."
Unfortunately, the EAT did not make it clear which particular 
civilised principle they were referring to, nor did they make clear 
which other sections of the Act were causing difficulties.
The issue of discrimination by association did not appear again in 
the law reports until 1999 when the Court of Appeal decided 
Weathersfield Ltd v. Sargent [1999] ICR 425. Again, this was a 
decision under the RRA 1976 and a case where an employee had 
been given instructions to discriminate against potential customers 
from ethnic minorities. Pill LJ stated that Showboat should not be 
overruled, and the phrase 'on racial grounds' should be given a 
broad meaning. Thus, discrimination by association was covered 
despite the fact that the narrower interpretation had to be given to 
the SDA 1975. The broad meaning was “justified and appropriate” 
(pp 428-429.)  Swinton-Thomas LJ made an interesting distinction 
in reaching the same conclusion, and Beldam LJ agreed with him. 
He thought it was unhelpful to try to ascertain the intention of the 
draftsman of the 1976 Act, nor the intention of Parliament, because 
it was unlikely that discrimination by association – he did not use 
the term - was considered by either. Rather, the “intention 
underlying the Act itself and the words used” were more helpful (at 
p 434).
The EAT returned to the issue again in the unreported case of 
Carter v. Ahsan UKEAT/0907/03/(2)/DM in 2004. The facts were 
very complicated, but the simple issue arose as to what 
characteristics a proper comparator should and should not have. 
The EAT felt that, what it called 'discrimination by association', was 
covered by the RRA 1976 - indeed, it stated that this was now 
”settled law” (at para.68).
Each of the cases considered above was uncontroversial in that the 
result in each was in accordance with the clear policy of the RRA 
1976. Much more difficult was the highly significant case of 
Redfearn v. Serco Ltd [2006] IRLR 623. The employee, who was 
white, was unable to bring an unfair dismissal claim against his 
employers because of insufficient continuity of employment. He 
thus brought a claim under the RRA 1976 that he had been 
dismissed 'on racial grounds'. The grounds were his membership of 
the British National Party, restricted to whites, and which espouses 
right wing views on racial matters. He claimed that he was 
dismissed on the grounds of the ethnic origin (primarily Asian) of 
the members of the public with whom he closely worked. The 
employers claimed that they dismissed him on grounds of health 
and safety, fearing violence from fellow employees and Asian 
members of the public. The employers also feared annoyance and 
anger would be directed towards them for continuing to employ 
someone with his views, even though these had never been aired at 
work. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, Mr Redfearn lost his case in the 
employment tribunal, but unexpectedly won in the EAT. The Court 
of Appeal took the view that the reasoning in Showboat justified a 
finding that the dismissal was on health and safety grounds rather 
than racial grounds but furthermore that Showboat was not 
confined to cases of unlawful instruction to discriminate. 
Discrimination by association did not, however, cover all cases 
where race was a significant factor in the act of the alleged 
discriminator. This would extend to cases where those committing 
discriminatory acts did so for reasons of race, and would therefore 
have race discrimination claims themselves if they were to be 
punished for it. The Court of Appeal clearly felt that the purposes of 
the legislation had to be borne in mind, and these are to prevent 
racial discrimination, not to protect those who have racist views.
One consequence of the decision in Redfearn is that discrimination 
by association under the RRA 1976 has been recognised no longer 
only in cases where there has been an instruction to discriminate 
given by the employer. It may seem somewhat curious that it was 
only in that type of case that discrimination by association arose in 
that there are separate provisions in the legislation concerning 
instructions, and pressure, to discriminate. (See RRA 1976, ss 30, 
31.) However, these are reserved for the Commission for Equality 
and Human Rights and cannot be relied upon by individual 
claimants.
Indirect Discrimination
So far it has been assumed that incidences of discrimination by 
association will occur as a result of direct discrimination. However, 
this is not necessarily the case. It is quite possible for it to result 
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from an act of indirect discrimination, although this may of course 
be much more difficult to recognise. Say, for example, that 
employer A requires all employees (including B) to work full-time. B 
is a carer for C, who is disabled. This is clearly an instance of 
indirect discrimination against B, the requirement being one that 
he or she is able to comply with but which is more difficult for B 
(and others in a similar position) to comply with, compared with 
other employees, as a consequence of C's disability. (The 
legislation, depending on context, as well as requirements also 
covers conditions, provisions, criteria and practices. For ease of 
explanation here it will be assumed that a requirement is in issue.)
Having said this, although much discriminatory treatment on 
grounds of disability may result from such indirect discrimination, 
it is much more difficult to identify credible examples from other 
areas of discrimination. (It is therefore somewhat ironic that the 
DDA 1995 does not cover indirect discrimination as a separate 
head of claim.) The difficulty arises, perhaps, because the demands 
made on a person, leading to an inability to comply with 
requirements of an employer, are less likely to arise because of (for 
example) the sexual orientation, sex, or religious belief of another. 
So, for example, if A discriminates against B because of the sexual 
orientation of C, it is only likely to impact on B if he or she is the 
partner of C, and therefore involves direct discrimination against B 
also.
What these examples also show is that there need not be 
discrimination on a ground with which the protected group cannot 
comply in order for it to amount to indirect discrimination by 
association. So, in the example just given, C might easily be able to 
comply with the requirement to be full-time even though B cannot. 
The inability to comply with the requirement would not have arisen 
but for the disability of the person being cared for, and this is the 
correct focus, not whether the disabled person could comply with it 
or not. The difficulty here, however, is that indirect discrimination 
in its statutory guise is somewhat narrower than this in that the 
requirement needs to be one that a smaller proportion of the 
protected category can comply with compared to those not in the 
protected category.  The result would seem to be that, even in cases 
where the legislation has been held to cover discrimination by 
association, and also covers indirect discrimination, many instances 
of indirect discrimination by association will fall foul of the 
statutory language and its victims unprotected. To provide such 
protection legislation would need to extend to those who are 
disproportionately affected by being associated with someone in a 
protected category, and not depend upon those in the protected 
category themselves suffering a disproportionate impact.
Grounds for Including Discrimination by Association
There are several grounds why in principle discrimination 
legislation should cover discrimination by association. There are 
also some arguments for not doing so. Each will now be considered 
in turn.
Social Policy
The argument from social policy turns on the idea that all 
discrimination legislation exists to effect social change. Its aims are 
to protect those in society from detrimental treatment on grounds 
that are unjustified in moral principle. It is also functional in the 
sense that it seeks to bring about change in social attitudes by 
making such grounds recognised by the public at large as being 
morally unacceptable as grounds of action or decision. This being 
the case, it does not matter (the argument might run) in what 
manner or by what route anyone is detrimentally treated on such 
grounds. If they are, that is enough to make such treatment 
unlawful.
There is clearly much force in this argument in that it reflects the 
public perception of discrimination legislation. It would also seem 
to have much weight in morality, and is almost self-evidently 
justifiable. A difficulty with the argument, however, as a tool for the 
construction of existing legislation, is that the historical basis for 
much discrimination legislation does not lie in moral 
considerations, but in economic and political ones. Furthermore, 
the law itself does not fully support such a view of its foundation as 
is shown, for example, by the inability to bring class actions.
Consistency in Principle
This argument takes the approach that there is a virtue in principle 
for legislation, the justification of which exists in the pursuit of a 
single principled aim, to achieve that with the maximum amount of 
consistency. For different pieces of discrimination legislation to 
have unnecessary differences clearly tends against that. This is not 
only undesirable but also is irrational, and it is undoubtedly a 
fundamental feature of good law that it does not display 
irrationality. In the absence of a Single Equality Act covering all 
grounds of discrimination within one provision, it can only be 
hoped that this broad principle can be recognised as a legitimate 
canon of construction. The genesis of a Single Equality Act could 
only involve identical treatment between the various areas of 
coverage of the legislation. It would surely be unthinkable that 
these inconsistencies could survive the introduction of such an Act.
Such is the view. However, it is also arguable that the heads of 
discrimination recognised by law do not belong to any identifiable 
genus, other than that they concern areas of social life where 
discrimination has been such a problem that it has been deemed 
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necessary for the law to intervene. Unless there were to be general 
discrimination legislation, in the sense of law that made unlawful 
all differential treatment between persons on irrelevant criteria, it 
will be the case that this will be the factor that groups the grounds 
of discrimination recognised by law. As such, the argument for 
identical treatment for all such grounds is weaker than it appears 
at first glance.
The Framework Directive
Closely linked to the idea considered in the previous paragraph, 
being its practical flip-side, is the EU Framework Directive which 
provides an overarching justification for all discrimination 
legislation. As we have seen, it clearly provides for the inclusion of 
discrimination by association within its definition of discrimination. 
Article 2.1 states that the principle of equal treatment shall mean 
that there shall be no direct or indirect discrimination whatsoever 
'on any of the grounds' referred to in Article 1, namely religion or 
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation regarding 'employment 
and occupation'. It is therefore arguable that any failure to include 
discrimination by association within domestic legislation will 
involve a breach of the Directive.
Avoidance Techniques
A further practical consideration is that not to include 
discrimination by association within the definition of discrimination 
leaves open the door to forms of direct discrimination failing to be 
covered by the legislation. In other words, some unlawful 
discrimination could be avoided by diverting or directing the 
discriminatory act to a person not within a designated protected 
category. This form would appear to include unintentional as well 
as intentional discrimination. Even if this were to have an indirect 
detrimental impact on the person within that category that is not 
something that comes under the statutory definitions of indirect 
discrimination, as we have seen. This is because such 
discrimination requires, for example, a requirement or condition to 
be applied to the person in the protected category. By definition, 
this is not the case with discrimination by association.
Association is Two-Way
A final argument is that discrimination by association is a two-way 
concept. If one thinks of it as transferred discrimination, this idea is 
a little clearer. If A treats B less favourably than he treats, or would 
treat, C on a ground that pertains not to B but to D, then it can be 
seen that, whilst A (in principle if not in law) discriminates against 
B, he may also be discriminating against D.  This is, of course, 
contingent rather than necessary in practical terms, but in 
psychological, social and moral terms it may be seen to be much 
stronger than that. There is something that is (perhaps necessarily) 
diminishing to D if, because of a feature or characteristic that 
pertains to him or her that is a protected ground if applied D 
directly, B thereby suffers a detriment. D has become the 
instrument of detrimental treatment to B for reasons that, in other 
circumstances, are considered sufficient to ground legal protection.
Grounds for Excluding Discrimination by Association
However, there are some arguments for excluding discrimination 
by association from the definition of discrimination by association.
Confusion with Other Legislation
One possibility for the different treatment of discrimination by 
association in legislation is that it has been the effect of an 
oversight, resulting in wording that has been construed in a way 
that was not originally intended. However, discrimination by 
association has been in the legal consciousness for quite some time 
now, as we have seen, and there has not been a conspicuous 
attempt to make corrections. In any event, there is evidence that 
shows that the issue has been considered in relation to 
discrimination legislation, but consciously not followed up. So, for 
example, in the recent Notes by the Department of Trade and 
Industry on the new age discrimination legislation (see 
http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file27136.pdf) it is clear that it was 
considered to be a viable option to include discrimination by 
association. However, the reason for not doing so is curious, namely 
that it would create confusion with 'family friendly' legislation 
(para.9) This is thought to necessitate the specific provision for 
perception in regulation 3 and the provision for instructions to 
discriminate in regulation 5. It is hard to see the specific 
connection between discrimination by association (or 
discrimination on the grounds of association as it is there referred 
to) and the areas covered by 'family friendly' legislation. Perhaps 
one example might be where one requires time off work or flexible 
working hours to look after an elderly parent or young child. In any 
event, such rights extend only so far as to make a request, and do 
not give an entitlement to the treatment itself. (See Employment 
Rights Act 1996 s 80F as amended by the Work and Families Act 
2006 s 12.) It is interesting that this reason does not appear in the 
DTI's Explanatory Memorandum on the regulations laid before 
Parliament (see SI 2006 No. 1031.)
It would also be an argument that would not be significant in other 
contexts. For example, there would seem to be no difference in 
principle between race (and other forms of discrimination) and sex 
discrimination in this regard. The White Paper preceding the RRA 
1976 made it clear that that Act and the SDA 1975 were intended 
to be the same. It stated that 
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"[e]xcept for good reason, the two statutes and the 
procedures for their administration and enforcement will be 
framed in similar terms. It is hoped in this way to ensure 
wider public understanding of the meaning and effect of the 
legislation in both fields." (Racial Discrimination 1975 Cmnd 
6234 at para.50)
In any event, that there might be overlap does not entail confusion. 
That a person might have a choice of remedy does not entail that 
they are confused as to what remedies they may have. If the real 
argument is that such persons should not have both remedies, then 
that could be easily dealt with in the same way that such overlaps 
occur in other areas of law, such as between claims in contract and 
tort.
Policy
Another argument is that, far from advancing the moral purpose of 
anti-discrimination legislation, to include discrimination by 
association would allow discrimination of the very type the 
legislation seeks to allow. One only needs to be reminded of 
Redfearn (considered above) to understand the possibilities here. It 
is a dangerous strategy to rely on the courts to give effect to the 
policy of the legislation when the wording of the text seems to go 
against it. The difficulty here is that it is problematic to arrive at a 
definition of discrimination that includes discrimination by 
association that does not allow people like Mr Redfearn to succeed. 
It would be necessary to include within the definition (or adjunct to 
it) a restriction on the field of application of the definition 
determined by particular policy considerations. That is not the 
normal approach of drafters of legislation in this country and would 
be extremely difficult to achieve.
A second possible policy consideration is that to include 
discrimination by association would not necessarily protect the 
intended group or category. It is not immediately obvious why 
someone who does not belong to such a category should be 
protected as if they were members of it. Whilst initially attractive, 
this argument does seem to fall to two ripostes. The first is that, 
insofar as the legislation is at all created in order to eradicate 
discrimination driven by certain attitudes and beliefs, the 
mechanism required to give effect to that is irrelevant. It is a 
consideration quite distinct from directly protecting members of 
those particular groups. The second is that discrimination often 
occurs in situations where a person is being used merely as the 
agency by which discrimination against someone in a protected 
group is sought to be brought about. This is most obvious in those 
cases involving instructions to discriminate. Whilst it might be 
possible for those in the protected categories to bring claims in 
such circumstances, this is an additional means of protection.
Literal Approaches
Finally, an argument against inclusion of discrimination by 
association might be based upon the desirability of following literal 
approaches to the interpretation of legislation as far as possible. It 
is an argument that clearly was felt to have a great deal of force in 
the EAT's decision in Redfearn. Whilst there is clearly merit in the 
idea, it would be difficult to claim any superior status for this over 
and above the other arguments of principle, policy and pragmatism 
considered above.
Conclusion
It is perhaps surprising that it has taken as long as it has for the 
idea of discrimination by association to take hold, even if it has yet 
to be recognised as a discrete form of discrimination with its own 
label in either legislation or case-law. Perhaps part, at least, of the 
reason for this, is that it has been recognised until very recently 
only within a very narrow scope, namely instructions to 
discriminate in race discrimination claims. However, although 
Redfearn temporarily gave the impression that this was unlikely to 
be extended, even in race discrimination cases, this will surely not 
survive a decision by the ECJ in Coleman that it is covered by the 
Framework Directive. Although instructions to discriminate are of 
course serious, the effect of the discrimination suffered by Mrs 
Coleman would appear to be of an entirely different order. If the 
decision goes in her favour, and it is recognised that discrimination 
by association should be covered by all forms of discrimination 
legislation, we can expect that the idea will be come of very major 
importance indeed.
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